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ESSAyS
The﻿Limits﻿of﻿Tolerance﻿in﻿Public﻿Universities1
José Felix Lozano Aguilar, Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla and Elsa González 
Esteban
Abstract:﻿In this article, our aim is to reflect on the legitimate ways that religious 
pluralism may be managed in the state-owned public university environment. To 
do this, it will be necessary to take into consideration the essential characteristics 
of the origin of the university. The second point in our work will be to clarify the 
concept of tolerance and its difference from neutrality, which will allow us to carry 
out the reflection and subsequent discussion with rigour. For our third point, we will 
describe the essential characteristics of the religious conflicts that can be found in 
our European universities and how they are being managed.
Following a critical analysis of these cases, we will present a proposal of criteria 
to be used in evaluating the religious practices in state-owned public universities 
based on the theory of discourse ethics. Finally, in the conclusion we will indicate 
some new lines of research and the path that public institutions may follow in man-
aging religious conflict.
Keywords: discursive ethics, toleration, public universities, dialoge, ethical 
values
Introduction
Today, universities are spaces where plurality, diversity and multiculturalism are 
lived intensively on a daily basis, and this is also true of the conflicts and prob-
lems derived from them. Thus, we can find that there are problems with religious 
symbolism in buildings (Germany) or on symbols belonging to publicly-owned 
universities (University of Valencia), such as groups demanding that they be able to 
show their religious identity on campus or in their departments.
Without doubt, conflicts of this type which appear in the university are even more 
complex – if that is possible – with regards to those that may occur in other public 
1 We acknowledge the support of the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme and the 
EuroEthos Research Project.
 We sincerely appreciate the critical comments made by participants of the congress “Values and 
Diversity”, held in Pilzen in August 2008. We also thank the critical comments made by anony-
mous reviewers.
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places, such as hospitals. This complexity is due to a series of factors derived from 
the history and the very function itself assigned to the university. In terms of their 
history, as we will point out later, we find that although the universities were first 
established by the Catholic Church, today public universities are governed by the 
secular values and principle characteristic of democratic governments. For this 
reason, they must combine an inherited tradition with a respect for the rights and 
liberties of different people and their diverse concepts of what is right. In terms of 
its functions, the university is a forum for critical reflection on social problems, 
and therefore must indiscriminately give a voice to the different contributions that 
– from the various perspectives – can be made to this reflection within the current 
context of interculturality.
The analysis of conflicts related to tolerance in the university thus turns out to 
be of fundamental importance: in the first place, because they affect an institution 
of great relevance to the development of society; in the second place, because the 
challenges of peaceful co-existence within diversity that are seen on our campuses 
today may be an incentive to try out new solutions for these conflicts that allow this 
institution to function better; and in the third place, because the proposals originat-
ing from the university may serve as models for other public environments.
The process for solving these problems in the university must include the analysis 
of the functions themselves which are assigned to this nearly thousand-year-old 
institution. This will be the first step in our research. Following that, we will explore 
the concept of tolerance in depth in order to recover its original meaning, tied more 
to that of recognising identity than to simple indifference. Only thus will the imple-
mentation of tolerance within the institution of the university be of practical use. 
In this way, we will be able to address specific cases which have appeared in this 
environment and how they have been resolved. As a solution to these problems, we 
propose some principles derived from discourse ethics that focus on the necessary 
deliberation between the two sides under symmetrical conditions. The values of 
civil ethics (Cortina, 1986, 1997, 2001, etc) – freedom, equality, solidarity, respect 
and dialogue – are the core values of the university, and their empowerment is one 
of the key functions of the University. At the same time, these values are the tools 
for the solution of cultural conflict.
The﻿University﻿–﻿Origin﻿and﻿Challenges
“The university is the second-oldest institution in the western world with an un-
broken history, after the Roman Catholic Church.” (Iyanga, 2000:7). In the late 
sixth century and beginning of the seventh, the first cathedral-based schools ap-
peared. Their task was to educate the secular clergy and to attract young people to 
the parish, to whom they then had to teach Scripture, as well as reading, writing 
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and arithmetic. Beginning with these schools, an unbroken evolution began that 
gave rise – in a way that was almost natural – to the world’s first university, the 
University of Bologna, in 1088. This was followed by Oxford University in 1167, 
the University of Paris in 1170 and the University of Salamanca in 1230. More 
recently, in the American tradition, the most prestigious universities have also had 
their origins and goals tied to religion, and to a large extent have continued the 
European tradition. Harvard, Yale and Dartmouth were founded by Congregational-
ists; William and Mary, and Columbia by the Anglicans; Princeton by the Presby-
terians; and Brown by the Baptists. The creation of all of these was inspired by the 
idea of religious service.
This religious origin has greatly influenced the development of the institution 
of the university and, although it is quite true that it has not determined its evolu-
tion, it has left an important mark on its institutional ethos. The process of the 
rationalisation and “disenchantment” of the world begun in the Enlightenment has 
also arrived at the university and, in particular, at the public universities of western 
culture, religious influence is limited and with a tendency towards decreasing. This 
is the context in which the conflict between maintaining the religious symbolism 
and traditions that are part of the institution’s history and the secularity of the state 
and of public spaces arises.
The Mission of the University
In our opinion, in order to respond to that dilemma, it is necessary to reflect seri-
ously on what the university’s mission – the social aim that gives it meaning – is 
(Barber, 1991; Cortina, 1993, 1998). The mission of the university has always been 
to seek and share information and to provide education for professionals. Spanish 
philosopher Ortega y Gasset understood the mission of the university to be the 
education of cultured people, where “culture” meant “the vital idea system of each 
time” (Ortega y Gasset, 1930:322). That is to say that the university must be at 
the service of life and offer a solution to social problems. To put it in the words of 
Coit Gilman, founder of Johns Hopkins University: “Make for less misery among 
the poor, less ignorance in the schools, less bigotry in the temple, less suffering 
in the hospitals, less fraud in business, less folly in politics” (Harkavy, 2006:10). 
If we focus on this last point, it is clear that the impact of the university on the 
development of democracy is unquestionable. Along these lines, Harkavy (2006:9) 
– following American pragmatic tradition – states that: “The goal for universities, 
I believe, should be to contribute significantly to developing and sustaining demo-
cratic schools, communities and society”. The role of the university in the develop-
ment of society goes beyond these specific objectives and presupposes a reflection 
on the ideal of humanity that we want. In the words of Nussbaum: “Our campuses 
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are producing citizens, and this means that we must ask what a good citizen of the 
present day should be and should know” (Nussbaum, 1997:3).
Carrying out this mission requires the development of particular functions that 
authors such as Ortega (1930), Jasper (1923) and Reed (2004) have put into four 
basic groups: education, basic research, cultural reproduction and professional 
training. These four functions are undergoing important transformations, some of 
which threaten the mission of the university.
Education
Educating people continues to be the fundamental objective of the university and 
higher education centres. Even when there are risks and problems resulting from 
the commodification of higher education (Odin – Manicas, 2004; Newman – Cou-
turier – Scurry, 2004; Reed, 2004), this continues to be its stated purpose.
In the model of the liberal university, “Bildung” is understood as a complex proc-
ess of maturation in which the critical appropriation of knowledge – and not the mere 
transmission of knowledge – is promoted. This model, which starting point is the 
search for truth and knowledge for its own sake, has been losing ground to the model 
of instruction in which the university must transmit information in order to educate 
professionals capable of finding high-paying jobs in the market. Knowledge has be-
come a valuable commodity that is bought and sold on the market (Reed, 2004).
The move from education (Bildung) to instruction in the universities is a process 
that causes their role as social actors to deteriorate and has a negative impact on the 
fight against global social problems. These problems, among which are religious 
conflicts, ecological challenges, peace, the strengthening of democracy, etc., now 
seem to be foreign to the university and they find no place there, nor are they con-
sidered to be a task suitable to institutions of higher education.
Research
Many profound changes are also taking place in the field of research. To address 
this topic in detail would go beyond the objectives and space of this work, but it is 
worth pointing out at least one aspect that has a key social impact. It is the strong 
tendency towards commodification of university research that is putting the goals 
and means of research into danger “Today, however, the growing influence of the 
market in higher education means that the search for truth is rivalled by a search for 
revenues.” (Newman – Couturier – Scurry, 2004:4).
These changes in the field of research lead us to situations of risk that we should 
observe with caution if we want research to continue to be at the service of advanc-
ing science and improving the lives of people. The statement by Reed sums this risk 
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up very well: “The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is a precondition for the 
integrity of basic research” (Reed, 2004:25).
Social Commitment
One of the most oft-repeated criticisms of our European universities over the 
years is that of having been at the edge of society, of being closed in and only con-
cerned with their own problems, neglecting their concerns for the common good. 
The lack of a decisive commitment to the most serious social problems – pollution, 
defence of human rights, and the generation of a constructively critical culture – has 
been criticised by civil society.
The role of universities in the discussion of global problems is decreasing. Their 
contribution to the solution of public issues is marginal and, in large part, consid-
ered something “extra” and not an essential part of their mission. Many people and 
university administrators understand that making a contribution to democracy and 
social justice is a second-order objective. We are, indeed, in agreement with Barber 
(1923), and we believe that the university must play a key role in the development 
of society in all of its dimensions: economic, political, social and cultural.
Without doubt, one way to develop a society is – as Kant stated (1784) more than 
200 years ago – to encourage the public use of reason. The university has tradition-
ally been a forum for debate and social innovation and rational discussion has been 
one of its defining characteristics. Today’s tendency seems to be moving in the other 
direction, and the universities are no longer “serving as home of open debate about 
critical but controversial societal issues” (Newman – Couturier – Scurry, 2004:218).
The commitment by the university to society implies that society will take on its 
role as the centre of discussion and critical debate on topics of social relevance. 
Thus, then, the debate on religious symbols and traditions in the university is im-
portant for at least two reasons. The first is because it is necessary to analyse up 
to what point the presence of institutional religious symbols and practices make 
rational debate, social coexistence and religious pluralism difficult. The second 
reason is that the academic institution is a good space for social innovation, and 
perhaps the specific solutions that we can experience in the university regarding 
religious activities, traditions and symbols may establish the pattern for addressing 
these issues in other social environments.
Tolerance﻿vs.﻿Neutrality﻿in﻿Public﻿Institutions
In order to understand the way that tolerance should be shaped in the university 
environment, we must first analyse what the characteristic elements of tolerance are 
in the modern era and this can only be done relative to the concept of neutrality.
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Certainly, both concepts – “tolerance” and “neutrality”- have occupied a central 
place within the scope of political theory since the birth of the modern era, with its 
range of application being the problem of social stability. Nevertheless, in terms 
of its development, in reality there has been an evolution in the meaning of the 
term “tolerance” that will affect the relationship between the two. This change in 
meaning is what explains to us that – although in the beginning it was the concept 
of “tolerance” that enjoyed more protagonism in the public sphere – in the con-
temporary period “neutrality” is pre-eminent, with tolerance being relegated to the 
scope of personal relationships.
In the Middle Ages, we find societies built around a single concept of good – 
usually a religion – shared by the great majority of citizens and serving as a basis 
for political legitimisation and social self-comprehension. However, this way of 
thinking broke with the abrupt appearance of the Protestant Reformation and the 
moral and religious pluralism it brought. The blood-filled wars of religion of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the most evident proof that, from that time 
on, those who governed could no longer base their decision on the dictates of one 
religion, because, obviously, none was held in common. Likewise, neither could 
they devote themselves to imposing a particular doctrine on the whole of society, 
because that could only have been accomplished through the annihilation of those 
groups contrary to that religion, thereby prolonging the situation of war that the 
political power was charged with stamping out.
Thus, the concept of political legitimacy took a radical turn. In modern times, 
it could no longer base itself on a concept of truth in particular, but rather on the 
capacity for maintaining a situation of peace that would stop the warring between 
different creeds. This was the idea of that period’s social contract theoreticians 
such as Locke and Hobbes. However, this new way of understanding the idea of 
legitimacy has a clear reference: religious tolerance. If the person who governs 
cannot base his decisions on a particular religion, it will be understood that he must 
be tolerant with the various different religious faiths present in society. At that time, 
there was talk of “tolerance” but not of “neutrality”. Hence, Lock’s titling of two of 
his essays as An Essay Concerning Toleration and A Letter Concerning Toleration. 
In this sense, we can say that the meaning of neutrality is included in tolerance 
itself, though it had a specific meaning that – strictly speaking – distinguishes it 
from neutrality in its current meaning and explains why one and not the other was 
used in the field of theory.
Tolerance does not mean that he who governs should be neutral between the dif-
ferent churches so much as it must recognise the liberty of conscience of all citizens 
in choosing their particular faith. That is to say, what is underlies this approach 
is a differentiation of functions: that which concerns the application of laws, and 
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that which affects spiritual issues. Thus, two spheres are distinguished: the public 
(political) and private (the conscience of the citizen). He who governs must devote 
himself to keeping the peace and to protecting the rights of citizens – such as their 
freedom and their property – but must never intervene in those issues concerning 
faith, such as what the true religion is (Cortina, 2003). This is so because decisions 
about faith fall within the natural human right to freedom of conscience: each per-
son can – through his conscience – discern what the true religion is (given that the 
pluralism of doctrines makes it impossible to determine this publicly); hence also 
Locke’s conception of churches as freely-formed collectives whose members have 
the freedom to change religion if they understand that the other religion is the true 
religion.
Thus, tolerance appears when differentiating between the public and the private 
sphere, in such a way that he who governs cannot legislate on subjects that affect 
the conscience (and the natural freedom) of citizens. He who governs cannot decide 
which religion is the true religion, and for this reason must respect the existence 
of different churches, as long as none of them interferes in the public sphere re-
served for state activities, for example, requiring obedience to a foreign sovereign. 
However, the respect toward churches – which may be understood as neutrality – is 
conditioned on the respect that is due to citizens’ freedom of conscience. This is 
the original meaning of tolerance which, as we can see, implies the idea of neutral-
ity (Wilson, 1996). The State must be neutral between the different churches and 
therefore may not impose any one upon the rest of society. However, it should 
not impose any, not because otherwise it would not maintain equality among the 
groups, but rather because doing so would violate the natural right of individuals to 
freedom of conscience, invading the private sphere that does not concern it. At the 
base of all of this lies the individual and his rights, not equality among groups.
It is during current times that the relationship between neutrality and tolerance 
has made a slight shift towards differentiation. In fact, we can say that now the ben-
efits that the idea of neutrality represents for political theory have been discovered. 
Proof of this change is the significant fact that contemporary political philosophers 
speak of “neutrality” and not “tolerance.” It is thus since currently tolerance and 
neutrality seem to be applied in two different scopes: neutrality seems to be more a 
virtue of the institutions and tolerance a virtue applied to citizens. The State, as well 
as the university, must be neutral among the concepts of good, while the citizen 
must be tolerant towards those who think differently than he does. The most evi-
dent example of this new paradigm is represented by contemporary liberal authors 
such as Rawls (1993), Audi (2000) and Galston (1991), with the former being the 
author whose idea of neutrality will influence the rest, and thus worthy of special 
attention. Rawls makes neutrality among comprehensive doctrines the backbone 
16
The﻿Limits﻿of﻿Tolerance﻿in﻿Public﻿Universities
José Felix Lozano Aguilar, 
Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla 
and Elsa González Esteban
of state action within a context of moral pluralism, such as the current democratic 
societies.
Focusing now on the idea of neutrality, in the first place, the concept cannot be 
understood in an absolute sense (Meckled-García, 2001). One may be neutral, yet 
always in regard to something in particular, and neutrality may be achieved depend-
ing on that with regard to which one wishes to be neutral. For example, the State 
may remain neutral between Catholics and Protestants, but perhaps not between 
Catholics and cannibals. In this sense, Rawls understands that a reasonable plural-
ism – not merely any pluralism – must exist within democracies. In other words, 
society must include only reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which are those 
recognising the prioritisation of the demand for justice over the ideals of the good 
life. The political notion of justice may only be neutral within these reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines which allow for peaceful coexistence within a context of 
moral pluralism.
In this case, how is neutrality to be understood? Rawls (1993) distinguishes 
among several connotations of neutrality. He mentions, on the one hand, the neu-
trality of effect, and on the other, justificatory neutrality. The former establishes that 
the State must avoid any action which may favour or prejudice the development 
of one doctrine over another. Rawls takes a clear stand against this alternative, 
working from the understanding that any action taken by institutions may lead to 
consequences for the development of one doctrine or another, but that this influence 
is in fact inevitable, given that the State can not fail to act when faced with certain 
situations. For this reason, Rawls comes down on the side of justificatory neutrality, 
in which the institutions must not hope to favour or prejudice any doctrine present 
in society through their actions. It would, of course, be different – as we have just 
seen – should a concrete act result unintentionally in support or condemnation of 
a doctrine. For example, the manner of deciding the day of the week on which a 
university exam will be held may be a “majority rules” situation. Yet, if the majority 
select a Friday (given that the majority of the students are Christians), this would 
not be discriminatory to other groups such as Jews or Muslims, as the professor’s 
intention was not to defend the interests of the Christians, but rather to decide the 
date of the exam through a democratic procedure. This would be one way to express 
neutrality within the context of the University. One could say perhaps that the out-
come is not a neutral one, but the fact remains that in public affairs, it is not always 
possible to reach decisions which satisfy everyone, as in cases such as abortion 
(Williams, 1999; Van Wyck, 1987).
Let us now look at the issue of tolerance. Currently, it is understood as a simple 
indifference to the Other. “To tolerate” has come to mean something along the 
lines of “consenting to” or “accepting” the beliefs of others. Nonetheless, this is 
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a mistaken idea which stems primarily from use of the term in everyday language. 
Within theory, the expression “tolerance” occupies a place superior to that of mere 
“indifference” (Meckled-García, 2001). It is true that while neutrality has an active 
sense with regards to state actions, tolerance has a passive connotation and refers to 
that which we ought to respect in others and against which we can do nothing. As I 
have said, though, this sense of passivity ought not to be confused with mere indif-
ference towards that which is not approved (Giner, 2002). As we have seen, it was 
originally understood more as the State’s refusal to oppress certain beliefs. Today 
– as it is applied to individuals – the word must be seen as respect for that which 
is different, not because it is inferior, rather the opposite, because it is believed to 
possess a supreme value. Religious tolerance is not indifference to religion; rather 
it is the admission that it possesses a supreme value. For this reason, religion must 
remain outside the political arena and not be imposed upon others (Carey 1999). 
Thus, today as well, a tolerant citizen is not one who looks upon others with indif-
ference or doubts; it is a person who recognises an absolute value in himself and in 
his opting for a good life (Cortina, 1995).
Analogously, tolerance as it is applied within the university emerges from the rec-
ognition of distinct identities, and of the value of contributions made by different 
communities. Only in this way can the university as an institution adequately fulfil its 
mandate to educate a citizenry which is tolerant, within a context of moral pluralism. 
The typology of conflicts which we will discuss below constitutes a fair example of 
the need to implement this new focus, which we will develop further on.
Religious﻿Conflicts﻿in﻿European﻿Universities
The various religious conflicts at European universities which have made it into 
the media and the courts – whether national or European – present quite different 
typologies. One could say that there are three sorts of religious conflicts which are 
well-documented by specific philosophical or legal studies in the national presses 
of EU countries.
The first type of religious conflict is one related to religious symbols worn by 
students or professors. The second is connected to religious symbols which are 
permanently located in the buildings or on the identifying symbols of the university 
institution. Finally, the conflict also surfaces in relation to guarantees of religious 
practice in public centres.
It should be pointed out that when addressing the difficulty which stems from 
the first two types of conflict (religious symbols, whether worn, or permanent) one 
should differentiate between those which are inarguably religious and those whose 
religious origin has been secularised or which have taken on other significance. 
The crux of the conflict lies, therefore, on the one hand, on how one understands 
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the principle of neutrality meant to be exercised by the university as a public in-
stitution, and on the other, on the exercise of tolerance and freedom within the 
democratic principles of coexistence.
The cases stemming from the use of religious symbols by students and professors 
best documented within a university setting occurred in Belgium, France, Great Brit-
ain, Switzerland and Turkey, with some of the cases leading to judgments by the 
courts (Alenda – Pineda, 2006; Llamazares, 1998, 2005; Contreras – Celador, 2007).
As far as the specific cases of conflicts derived from the existence of permanent 
religious symbols, we could point to those which occurred in Germany, Italy and 
Spain (Alenda – Pineda, 2006; Llamazares, 1998, 2005; Contreras – Celador, 2007). 
The central point of the debate lies in the fact that the presence of these symbols 
could compromise the right to freedom of conscience of those persons who do not 
identify with the religion of the symbols exhibited. Given that we are speaking of 
public spaces in which the State must guarantee the secular or non-confessional 
principle, confusion may arise between the State’s aims and those of religion. In 
public universities, the decision has been reached generally that it is the centre itself 
which must decide to uphold or withdraw the permanent religious symbols, due to 
their autonomous nature.
With regard to the tension at universities over the practice of religion, various 
debates have emerged within the public universities in Spain, and in certain cases 
even reached the point of requiring the State’s intervention. By religious practice, 
we refer, according to Contreras Mazarío to: “the positive guarantee, or legal duty 
to act, which the State, and public powers establish for the full and effective prac-
tice of religious freedom by persons, members of centres or establishments who 
may find themselves in a position of dependency or subject to those in which their 
physical freedom is limited or cut off” (Contreras , 2000:111). Taking into account 
this characterisation of religious practice in public centres, it should be pointed out 
that in public university educational centres do not produce a level of dependency 
which would impede or limit the exercise of religious rights or freedoms. For this 
reason, each university centre must respond to the demands and they may do so in 
a positive or a negative manner. As Contreras put it: “(…) religious practice must 
not be obligatory for university centres, rather it ought to only be discretional, and 
if established should be voluntary for the personnel of the university and for its 
students” (Contreras, 2000:157–158).
Thus, in Spain there is no legal norm for the university sphere which addresses 
the core question, which is to determine whether these centres fall within the cat-
egory of public centres obliged to provide said religious presence, or whether it is a 
matter of the autonomy of each centre (Contreras – Celador, 2007). When the ten-
sion is such that is has led to a judicial resolution, jurisprudence has been extremely 
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varied in its pronouncements. For example, it was negative in the matter of a group 
of professors and students at Carlos III University in Madrid who requested a place 
prepared for religious practice, as the tribunal understood that the decision was 
within the discretion of academic authorities, who could respond either positively 
or negatively. The decision to guarantee and/or promote religious practice falls to 
the university governing centres, which possess full autonomy.
The landscape here is varied. For example, the aforementioned Carlos III Uni-
versity has opted to refuse, while other universities including University of Huelva 
and Rey Juan Carlos University in Madrid have maintained a position which is, in 
principle, in favour of the Catholic Church. A third, more interesting response – in 
our opinion – came from Barcelona’s Pompeu Fabra University, where a common 
“meditation” or “meeting place” has been set up, with the intention of encourag-
ing and responding to the multiculturalism and the pluralism of religious beliefs 
(Contreras – Celador, 2007).
Evaluation﻿Criteria﻿from﻿the﻿Ethics﻿of﻿Discourse
The suggested discursive ethic affirms that “only those norms that can (or could) 
meet with the acceptance of all concerned in practical discourse can claim validity.” 
(Habermas, 1983:103). This ethical perspective considers dialogue not only as a 
medium, but also as a criterion for evaluation of real communication situations. 
Dialogue is therefore not only the procedure used to convince others and achieve 
one’s subjective interests, but also the only rational medium available to locate the 
path of correctness and inter-subjective truth (Cortina 1985).
In the first place, one must acknowledge that institutions of higher learning must 
commit to the liberal education of students. As Nussbaum writtes: “Liberal educa-
tion in our colleges and universities is, and should be, Socratic, committed to the 
activation of each student’s independent mind and to the production of a community 
that can genuinely reason together about a problem (…)” (Nussbaum, 1997:19). In 
other words, the task of the university is not only the education of good profession-
als but also of good citizens. In the second place, the university must educate from 
within a deeply rooted cosmopolitanism which assumes that we are speaking from 
specific cultures, languages and religions, but this must be done with the conviction 
that we can make ourselves understood to any being who is communicatively com-
petent (Cortina, 2001). We must accept the moral and religious pluralism in society, 
and mould the students so they are able to live and co-exist in this Lebenswelt. In 
the third place, one must recognise that in authentic civic ethics, the relation among 
the (religiously inspired) ethics of maximuns and the ethics of minimums, must be 
complementary rather than exclusive (Cortina, 2001; Conill, 2007). Fourthly, it is 
important to acknowledge that the existence and public expression of one’s own 
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cultural and religious concepts are themselves valuable and are an inherent right 
of citizenship (PNUD Report, 2004). Finally, we must understand the process of 
secularisation as a learning process in which secularism learns from that which is 
religious and vice versa (Conill, 2007).
Following the previous general considerations, we will move on to the specific 
implications which the ethics of discourse can contribute to the ordering of a reli-
gious plurality within the space of a public university.
In our opinion, the primary criterion to be followed in the case of religious ten-
sion is the predominance of good arguments, those which are rationally based, as 
opposed to arguments stemming from power, manipulation or imposition. To put 
it in Habermas’ words: “In a secular state, only those political decisions are taken 
to be legitimate as can be impartially justified in the light of generally accessible 
reasons (…)” (Habermas, 2006:129).
(1) Working from these criteria, we can affirm that within the University campus 
there should be no permission given for religious expression nor demonstrations 
which cannot be justified equally for religious, non-religious, or otherwise reli-
giously oriented citizens. There must certainly be no allowance made for behaviour 
which leads to confrontation, hatred or intolerance toward specific religious or 
secular points of view, to the strengthening of others or to the imposition of one 
over the others.
(2) The second criterion which can be derived from the ethics of discourse is 
what one could call the fomenting of autonomy. For the ethics of discourse, the 
stakeholders are those who have the right to participate in dialogues about norms 
affecting them; and it is assumed that these same affected people may legitimately 
defend their positions. The mündiger Bürger – or citizen possessed of reason – is 
the one who must choose his options in life. In the ethics of discourse, paternalism 
and imposition have no place. Actions stemming from this second criterion will be 
numerous and the objective of all of these will be the stimulation and strengthening 
of moral judgement as well as the rational capacity to shape the will according 
to universalisable principles. Specifically, the university institution must take the 
initiative in generating a rational debate in which preferences may be expressed 
and beliefs and lifestyles critically evaluated. For this to happen, it is crucial to 
guarantee freedom of expression and to simultaneously avoid the discrimination or 
stigmatisation of world-visions or lifestyles by any one religion. In this respect, the 
initiative at Pompeu Fabra University mentioned in this article seems like a good 
example to us.
(3) One of the basic tenets of the ethics of discourse is the symmetry among 
interlocutors in practical discourse. This symmetry is both the ideal and a criterion 
for evaluating the practical discourses within a real communication community. 
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Steps must be taken in two stages in order to seriously contemplate the symmetry 
of interlocutors: the individual and the contextual. At the level of the individual, 
the symmetry of participants requires measures which increase its capabilities not 
only its habilities (Sen, 1999); and at the contextual level, we must ensure the mate-
rial, social and political conditions so that people may participate in the discourses 
affecting them. This principle then will be concretised within the sphere of the 
university, on the one hand, by guaranteeing equal access to those mediums of 
expression and equity through the use of public space and resources. In our view, 
access to these resources – which permit equal opportunity in the use of rights and 
freedoms – must be socially equal and non-proportional, as a proportional division 
of the resources will only strengthen the dominant credos (Habermas, 2006). On the 
other hand, at an individual level, the university must commit itself to the promotion 
of cognitive or epistemic acts, and civic virtues aimed at resolving conflict in the 
public sphere through dialogue (Habermas, 2005; Cortina, 2001). This encourage-
ment must develop through extracurricular activities, and more importantly, in our 
opinion, through the introduction of specific materials on the ethics and rights of 
citizenship in each degree programme. The formation of critical attitudes and civic 
courage must be achieved in all possible spaces (Cortina, 2001).
(4) The final criterion we will refer to is the importance of dialogue, both as 
a means of searching for consensus and as an end. The best known way of set-
tling disagreements is through dialogue, not violence. Authentic dialogue signi-
fies recognition of the interlocutor’s dignity and implies a renunciation of violence 
and oppression. Thus, even when dialogue is not the quickest or most effective 
procedure for making collective decisions, it remains the most legitimate, given 
that it is grounded in the essential principle of respect for personal autonomy and 
the plurality of opinions. Dialogue is also the end, in the sense that it is an ethos, 
a moral form of life which manifests itself in all areas of human activity(Cortina, 
1995). Working from this criterion, we may affirm that the University must create 
spaces for permanent dialogue among the various religious faiths and must make 
an effort to avoid any sort of authoritarian pretensions or violent actions against any 
one faith or atheist group.
In our opinion, these are the arguments and criteria which through the ethics of 
discourse we may use for the management of religious and cultural conflicts at the 
university. By referring to Rawls (1971), and particularly through Sen’s (1999) 
and Nussbaum’s (1997) focus on capabilities, one finds support for these criteria. 
Nonetheless, given that our purpose is to propose normative criteria, we have opted 
for a strong philosophical basis.
“After all, whether the liberal response to religious pluralism can be accepted 
by the citizens themselves as the single right answer depends not least on whether 
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secular and religious citizens – each from their own respective angle – are prepared 
to embark on an interpretation of the relationship of faith and knowledge that first 
enables them to behave in a self-reflexive manner toward each other in the public-
political sphere”. (Habermas, 2006: 155).
Conclusion
The university has been, and remains, an institution which is central to society. 
Its evolution and development have been closely linked to the economic, cultural, 
political and social development of each country. Today, it finds itself in an impor-
tant process of transformation and the challenges which it faces are both diverse 
and important. It should be mentioned that among these tests is the attempt to foster 
harmonious coexistence among the various cultural and religious groups.
The university is a centre of knowledge and of mainstream education in our socie-
ties. Its task is the education not only of good professionals by also of responsible 
citizens. This means that they must manage the religious conflicts arising on our 
campuses. In order to address pluralism, it is necessary to find criteria and norms 
with a solid base and which can be shared by all. In our opinion, the ethics of dis-
course is a source of foundation building and of solid, practical criteria.
At least three relevant conclusions may be extrapolated from our research. The 
first is that the university has been – and remains – a forum for learning and social 
innovation, as well as a space of coexistence and common education. Secondly, the 
university must opt for an actively “neutral” attitude in the face of the diverse reli-
gious and secular views, through which all may learn from the rest and not merely 
settle for an attitude of tolerance and indifference toward the meaningful proposals 
offered by the various religions and philosophies.
In the third place, it is important to explain that by using the ethics of discourse as 
a foundation, we may extract a solid rational basis for the criteria which will frame 
the peaceful and constructive coexistence among the many religions. The primacy 
of rational arguments, the encouragement of autonomy, the search for symmetry 
and the consideration of dialogue as the mechanism used for conflict resolution, are 
all criteria which we may use for addressing religious conflicts and for the construc-
tion of a common ethos in a globalised world.
We believe that the construction of a common ethos requires a continuation of 
work in a double sense: the elaboration of a rational discourse about religious 
and atheist pluralism in institutions of higher learning, and the implementation 
of specific acts and innovative initiatives in mutual education, through which the 
students (and citizens) may be encouraged to develop a critical attitude and civic 
courage.
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